The Character of the Business:
Looking Through “Broken Windows” for Liability
in Mass Shootings & Other Third-Party Criminal Acts
Madison Shepley*
“One unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one
cares, and so breaking more windows costs nothing.”
-James Q. Wilson1
INTRODUCTION
A. Cascade Mall
On September 23, 2016, at 6:52 p.m., Arcan Cetin, armed with a
.22-caliber Ruger rifle, walked through the doors of Macy’s women’s
department store at Cascade Mall in Burlington, Washington.2 Within a
few steps, he randomly opened fire, beginning with 16-year-old Sarai Lara
who was standing by the clothing racks.3 The shooter, advancing further
into the store, then shot Wilton “Chuck” Egan, who was attempting to run
to his wife, before walking to the cosmetics counter and shooting Shayla
Martin.4 Then, at close range, he shot Belinda Galde and her 95-year-old
mother, Beatrice Dotson.5 The shooter placed the rifle on the top of the
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1. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenwindows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/G349-JRPR].
2. Casey McNerthney, Cascade Mall Shooting in Burlington: A Timeline of Events, KIRO 7
NEWS (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.kiro7.com/news/local/cascade-mall-shooting-in-burlington-atimeline-of-events/449864123 [https://perma.cc/54WV-KC82].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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cosmetics counter and left the store.6 Two minutes and fifty seconds—in
that time, one man was able to casually walk into the store with a clearly
visible semiautomatic weapon and murder five people in cold blood before
casually leaving the building.7 By the time the authorities were first called
at 6:58 p.m., he was long gone. He was not caught until the following night
in Seattle, Washington—nearly twenty-four hours later.8
Cascade Mall is an enclosed shopping center located in Burlington,
Washington, which opened in 1990.9 From 1999 to 2017, Cascade Mall
was owned by Macerich, a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) that is one
of the largest owners and operators of shopping centers in the United
States and is headquartered in Santa Monica, California.10 Following the
shooting, in January 2017, the mall was sold to Merlone Geier Partners, a
predominantly West Coast retail real estate investment firm based in
Washington and California.11 Like most malls, Cascade Mall contains
department stores, a food court, a movie theater, and kitschy cart vendors.
However, unlike most malls owned in 2016 by companies such as
Macerich and Merlone Geier Partners, Cascade Mall was quickly
becoming a low-grossing relic of 1990s mall culture.12 Members of the
6. Id.
7. Surveillance from inside Macy’s was later released with clear footage of the shooter, weapon,
and shooting. For a time and security perspective, see Video Leak Police, Video Shows Panic Inside
Burlington Mall Shooting, YOUTUBE (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bnOvj8Yp8I [https://perma.cc/END3-9WNQ]. Please note that this is graphic and sensitive material.
Viewer discretion is advised.
8. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 1.
9. Veronica Grecu, Macerich Sells Two Regionals Malls for $170M, COMMERCIAL PROP.
EXECUTIVE (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.cpexecutive.com/post/macerich-sells-two-regional-mallsfor-170m/ [https://perma.cc/FNC5-9YM2]; see also Cascade Mall Tops Burlington Projects, SKAGIT
VALLEY HERALD (Mar. 8, 1991), http://www.skagitriverhistory.com/FEMA/1991-3-8%20SVH%
20article.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY93-WNDW].
10. Mike Rosenberg, Cascade Mall Sold a Few Months After Mass Shooting, SEATTLE TIMES
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/real-estate/cascade-mall-sold-a-few-monthsafter-mass-shooting [https://perma.cc/U9BR-TSC9]; Cascade Mall Tops Burlington Projects, supra
note 9; Company Overview of Macerich Company, BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 2, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=332172 [https://perma.
cc/6JB5-T5W4].
11. ARTHUR M. COPPOLA & THOMAS E. O’HERN, MACERICH ANNUAL REPORT 2016, at 5
(2016), http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/m/NYSE_MAC_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J587-P74P]; MERLONE GEIER PARTNERS, https://www.merlonegeier.com/ [https
://perma.cc/CZ8T-F9BY].
12. See ARTHUR M. COPPOLA & THOMAS E. O’HERN, MACERICH ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 10
(2013), http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/m/NYSE_MAC_2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6CT8-24E4]; ARTHUR M. COPPOLA & THOMAS E. O’HERN, MACERICH ANNUAL
REPORT 2014, at 13 (2014), http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/m
/NYSE_MAC_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5W3-4M42]; ARTHUR M. COPPOLA & THOMAS E.
O’HERN, MACERICH ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 17 (2015), http://www.annualreports.com/
HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/m/NYSE_MAC_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TEN7-G6G5];
ARTHUR M. COPPOLA & THOMAS E. O’HERN, MACERICH ANNUAL REPORT 2016, at 6 (2016),
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Burlington community described Cascade Mall as “creepy,” “like it’s been
abandoned.”13 One stated that it “is a shadow of it’s [sic] glory days in the
late 90s early 2000s. It once was th[e] focal point for every teen in the
Skagit Valley. Now it’s just like some desolate catacombs . . . .”14
Notably, even the community’s youth have taken notice of the mall’s
ongoing declining state, reporting that “the mall seems like an empty
wasteland soon to collapse on itself,” and have expressed concern that “it’s
not a very secure place to settle.”15 These descriptions continue to remain
true as of mid-2018—the mall houses numerous empty storefronts while
Merlone Geier provides limited updated property leasing information or
indication as to future opportunities at Cascade.16
The state of Cascade Mall in 2016 is relevant for a crucial reason: it
signaled vulnerability. The actual and perceived state of a community is a
“window” into the safety of a community. Appearances of abandonment
and neglect reflect breaks in those “windows,” exposing untended
property and community breakdown. As a result, these broken windows
are further indicators that community barriers and controls are lessened or
“cracked”—thus presenting a vulnerable area to the opportunistic
criminal. This was particularly, and tragically, true in the case of Cascade
Mall. The vulnerable state of the mall is relevant because, on the evening
of September 23, 2016, one man decided that this mall was a good target,
or—at the very least—an easy target.
The Cascade Mall shooting is particularly notable because it came in
the wake of another Washington State shooting case that presented a
crucial legal clarification of the state’s definition and potential
interpretation of the “Prior Incidents Test”—McKown v. Simon Property
Group, Inc.17
B. Context Preceding the Shooting
Under Washington law, to show that a landowner’s obligation to
protect business invitees from third-party criminal conduct arises from
past experience, the plaintiff must generally prove that a history of prior
http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReports/PDF/NYSE_MAC_2016.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/J8MZ-RHM4].
13. See Cascade Mall-13 Reviews, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/biz/cascade-mall-burlington
(last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
14. Id.
15. Diego Bueno, Cascade Mall’s Numbers Continue to Drop, CUB (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://thecub.swsdonline.com/2575/community/cascade-malls-numbers-continue-to-drop/ [https://
perma.cc/D7RB-P5XD].
16. Scott Danielson, Many Stores Inside Cascade Mall Sit Empty, SKAGIT BREAKING
COMMUNITY NEWS (June 27, 2018), https://www.skagitbreaking.com/2018/06/27/many-storesinside-cascade-mall-sit-empty/ [https://perma.cc/4EWT-6EJN].
17. See generally McKown v. Simon Prop. Grp., 344 P.3d 661 (Wash. 2015).
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similar incidents on the premises exists.18 In addition, if the criminal act
injuring the plaintiff is not sufficiently similar in nature and location to
prior acts of violence or not sufficiently close in time to those prior acts,
or if the prior acts are not sufficiently numerous, then the third-party
criminal act is likely unforeseeable as a matter of law.19 This current, very
narrow, prior similar incidents test assures that businesses will be exposed
to liability on this basis only when they have numerous past experiences
of criminal conduct that make similar conduct on the premises foreseeable.
Unfortunately, Washington State is no stranger to mass gun violence.
On November 20, 2005, Dominick Maldonado walked into the Tacoma
Mall, in Tacoma, Washington, concealing a MAK-90 rifle and an Intratec
Tec-9 pistol and opened fire on shoppers and mall employees, ultimately
injuring seven people.20 Brendan McKown, an employee at the mall,
attempted to stop the shooter but was shot and wounded.21 Over a period
of approximately eight minutes, Maldonado injured seven people, the last
of whom was McKown.22 At the time of the shooting, there were four
unarmed security guards on duty and no security cameras.23 The mall was
equipped with an intercom system, but the system was inaudible and
inaccessible on the weekends, and the security guards were never trained
to use it.24
McKown brought a negligence action against the owner of the mall,
Simon Property Group, Inc. (Simon), alleging that Simon failed to exercise
reasonable care to protect him from foreseeable criminal harm.25 Simon
removed the case to federal court and successfully moved for summary
judgment.26 In granting Simon’s motion, the district court applied a “prior
similar acts” standard and found that there were no similar prior acts.27
Although the court received evidence of six other shootings and three other
gun-related incidents on the Tacoma Mall premises, it concluded that these
other incidents were significantly different in “nature, scale, and location”
from the mass shooting perpetrated by Maldonado.28

18. Id. at 669.
19. See id. at 665.
20. Id. at 662.
21. See generally Curt Woodward, Mall Shooting Victim Confronted Gunman, Family Says, THE
SEATTLE TIMES: LOC. NEWS (Nov. 22, 2005, 10:16 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/mall-shooting-victim-confronted-gunman-family-says/ [https://perma.cc/5WT2-CE55].
22. Id.
23. McKown, 344 P.3d at 662.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 663.
28. Id.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certified several
questions for the Washington Supreme Court, including (1) whether “prior
similar acts” are a prerequisite to business owner liability for failure to
prevent third-party criminal acts, and (2) if so, “how similar” must such
prior acts be to the criminal conduct at issue in order to create a jury
question on whether the criminal conduct was reasonably
foreseeable?29 With respect to the first question, the Washington Supreme
Court responded that “prior similar acts” are not the exclusive means of
establishing a duty on the part of a business owner; a known threat of
imminent harm could also suffice.30 As for the second question, the degree
of similarity required in order to find a duty based on “prior similar acts,”
the court stated,
[I]f the criminal act that injures the plaintiff is not sufficiently similar
in nature and location to the prior act(s) of violence, sufficiently close
in time to the act in question, and sufficiently numerous, then the act
is likely unforeseeable as a matter of law under the prior similar
incidents test.31

Thus, a business’s location in a high-crime area alone would be
insufficient to impose a duty on the owner to protect patrons against
violent crime perpetrated by third parties.32
However, in its opinion, the Washington Supreme Court explicitly
noted that it has not yet considered whether the character of a business
could invoke such a duty.33 The court suggested that future cases may
inquire as to the circumstances under which the “place or character” of a
business can give rise to a duty to protect invitees against third-party
criminal conduct.34 In McKown, Brendan McKown described the Tacoma
Mall as a “soft target,”35 whose place or character made the harm
reasonably foreseeable. Aside from that assertion, however, he offered no
explanation as to how or why the “character” of the mall necessarily made
the mass shooting in the case “reasonably foreseeable.”36 In order to
explain what “character” truly refers to, the remainder of this Comment
addresses and examines trends of analysis for foreseeability in order to
discern whether “character of the business” may be incorporated
expressly, implicitly, or theoretically.
29. McKown v. Simon Prop. Grp., 689 F.3d 1086, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2012), certified question
answered, 344 P.3d 661 (Wash. 2015).
30. McKown, 344 P.3d at 667.
31. Id. at 669.
32. Id. at 667–68.
33. Id. at 668.
34. Id. at 664.
35. Id. at 668.
36. Id.
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If one considers the state of Cascade Mall as a relic of the 1990s,
which was largely abandoned with increasingly empty storefronts, under
a “broken windows” theory there is room for argument that the mall was
particularly vulnerable to attack. Given its declining state, the
vulnerability of Cascade Mall made criminal acts against a soft target
reasonably foreseeable. Character of the business should be read and
applied as an expansion of how Washington State courts treat
foreseeability of third-party criminal acts and serve as a response to the
current, very narrow, prior similar incidents test. Character of the business
is an opening for a definition of what types of “states” or “characters” put
businesses or other premises on notice that they may be liable for thirdparty criminal acts.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the various state
analyses for determining liability for third-party criminal conduct. This
section highlights conservative and liberal aspects of each approach with
a particular critique of each approach’s utility in the prevention of thirdparty criminal conduct. Part II provides a specific breakdown of how states
have incorporated the concept of character of the business as a factor in
liability analyses. This section outlines current competing definitions of
character of the business and predicts a prevailing trend in interpretation.
Part III(A) will provide commentary on potential interpretations of
character of the business, which ought to be considered through the
criminological perspective of the broken windows theory. This section
also provides a comprehensive background of the broken windows theory
itself, including its history and criticism. The broken windows theory
provides a responsive framework to stave off future instances of thirdparty criminal conduct. Part III(B) discusses the implementation of a
broken windows interpretation of character of the business, along with
some alternatives and additions geared exclusively to Washington, to be
used to expand the current business owner liability for third-party criminal
conduct in Washington. This framework will provide an expansive
program that will be far more effective not only in combating mass gun
violence but also in the overall prevention of felonies. The program
promotes the safe practice of community monitoring and maintenance in
order to prevent businesses from becoming increasingly vulnerable and
susceptible to attacks.
I. OVERVIEW OF STATE ANALYSES FOR THIRD-PARTY CRIMINAL
CONDUCT LIABILITY
Traditionally, courts have not held business owners liable for thirdparty criminal acts because of the inherent unforeseeability of a random
shooting or other acts of violence. In fact, many jurisdictions continue to
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recognize the principle underscored in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
that a “possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his
business purposes is not an insurer of the safety of such visitors against the
acts of third persons . . . .”37 However, case law regarding third-party
criminal liability is inconsistent across the state jurisdictions. As the law
evolves, certain jurisdictions have carved narrow exceptions that
recognize third-party criminal acts as foreseeable based on the application
of a “prior similar incidents test” or a test that considers whether the
business owner had notice of imminent harm.38 Yet, other jurisdictions are
indicating a trend in the law that desires further expansion of the definition
of foreseeability beyond merely the consideration of prior similar
incidents by also applying a balancing or a totality of circumstances
analysis.39 This section outlines several different analyses for determining
liability for third-party criminal conduct particular to various states,
describing the analyses from restrictive to expansive.
A. The Specific Imminent Harm Test
The specific imminent harm test is one of the most conservative
forms of analysis. The test recognizes, beyond the general torts concept,
that a person does not have a duty to warn or protect another from the
criminal acts of a third person, particularly when the “third person
commits acts of assaultive criminal behavior because such acts cannot
reasonably be foreseen,” nor does it require that there must be “an
imminent probability of injury” from a third-party criminal act in order to
impose a duty to protect or warn.40 The following jurisdictions currently
apply this test (in order of descending restrictiveness): Virginia, Michigan,
and Arkansas.
In particular, Virginia has expressed a reluctance to impose a duty to
warn or protect invitees even where there are prior incidents of crime.41
Instead, the court has recognized “imminent probability of harm,” as a
“heightened degree of foreseeability that arises where the defendant
‘knows that criminal assaults against persons are occurring, or are about

37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
38. Paul Caleo & Lynn Rivera, Finding Random Acts of Violence Foreseeable, A Survey of States
Regarding Liability for Third-Party Criminal Conduct, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., Fall 2016, at 32.
39. Id.
40. Commonwealth v. Peterson, 749 S.E.2d 307, 311 (Va. 2013).
41. See Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, Inc., 540 S.E.2d 129, 133 (Va. 2001) (holding that two
robberies within the month preceding the attack on plaintiff were not a “level of criminal activity” that
would “have led a reasonable business owner to conclude that its invitees were in imminent danger of
criminal assault”).
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to occur, on the premises,’ based upon ‘notice of a specific danger just
prior to the assault.’”42
Analysis under the specific imminent harm test is highly factspecific, with the court frequently concluding that facts relied upon in
particular cases fail to establish a duty to protect against third-party
criminal acts.43 For instance, the court held that employee
misrepresentations about the safety of an apartment complex—where in
one year 656 crimes, including 113 against persons, had been reported—
failed to give rise to the duty to warn or protect from harm because these
facts failed to establish “an imminent probability of injury to [the plaintiff]
from a” criminal act of a third-party.44 Yet, five years later the court found
that a criminal act was imminent where the employees of an innkeeper had
contacted police ninety-six times to report criminal conduct including
robberies, assaults, and shootings.45 However, in this case, police had
specifically advised the innkeeper that “its guests were at a specific
imminent risk for harm to their persons from uninvited persons coming
into or upon its property.”46
In Virginia, it appears that “in only rare circumstances has [the]
[c]ourt determined that the duty to protect against harm from third-party
criminal acts exists.”47 Notably, even in case of the Virginia Tech
Massacre, the court found that there were insufficient facts to conclude
that the duty to protect students against third-party criminal acts arose as
a matter of law.48
Like Virginia, Michigan has similarly refused to impose a broad
definition of foreseeability for merchant liability for third-party crime. The
Michigan Court of Appeals purports to ground such a refusal in public
policy, holding that liability determination on the sole basis of “a
foreseeability analysis is misbegotten,” and rationalizes that “because
criminal activity is irrational and unpredictable, it is in this sense
invariably foreseeable everywhere.”49 In this application, emphasis is not
put on the person in control of the premises, but in the crime prevention
“because he is best able to provide a place of safety.”50 Respective of these
42. Peterson, 749 S.E.2d at 311 (quoting Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Skate America, Inc.,
540 S.E.2d.123, 127 (2001)).
43. See, e.g., Dudas, 540 S.E.2d at 133.
44. Yuzefovsky v. St. John’s Wood Apartments, 540 S.E.2d 134, 137–41 (Va. 2001).
45. Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 626 S.E.2d 428, 430 (Va. 2006).
46. Id.
47. Peterson, 749 S.E.2d at 312.
48. Id. (giving significant weight to the fact that the defendants believed that the shooter had fled
the area and posed no danger to others).
49. See Graves v. Warner Bros., 656 N.W.2d 195, 202 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
50. See id. at 200–01; see also Ross v. Glaser, 559 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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realities, the court has described that “it is unjustifiable to make merchants,
who not only have much less experience than the police in dealing with
criminal activity but are also without a community deputation to do so,
effectively vicariously liable for the criminal acts of third parties.”51
Rather stringently, the court further explained that beyond reasonably
aiding in police involvement, a merchant is under no obligation to provide
security guards or otherwise resort to self-help in order to deter or quell
such occurrences.52 As such, liability will likely only be found in
circumstances where a specific situation occurred on the premises that
would cause a reasonable person to recognize a risk of imminent harm to
an identifiable invitee. The court expressly stated that “it is only a present
situation on the premises, not any past incidents, that creates a duty to
respond.”53 The court has found limited exception to the limited duty rule
imposing liability, with the predominant circumstance being when a
criminal perpetrator was an employee and the employer had notice of the
employee’s propensity to commit the type of crime.54
The specific harm test has also been implemented in a modified form.
In Arkansas, a totality of the circumstances test was expressly disavowed
in favor of a joint application of the specific harm test and the prior similar
incidents test.55 The deciding case of Boren v. Worthen National Bank of
Arkansas involved a gun attack against two female patrons at a drivethrough ATM, where the gunmen approached from hiding to fire into the
vehicle of the victims and robbing them. In its consideration of the
applicability of each test (totality of the circumstances, specific harm, or
prior similar incidents), the court placed emphasis on specific business
owner knowledge and awareness, to recognize that “the duty of a business
owner to protect its patrons from criminal attacks,” exists “only where the
owner or its agent was aware of the danger presented by a particular
individual or failed to exercise proper care after an assault had
commenced.”56 In Boren, the court conducted analysis under each of the
tests, ultimately concluding that under the specific harm and prior similar
incidents tests that “two incidents of robbery at Worthen ATMs in the
nearly eight years prior to the attack on Boren [were] not sufficient to

51. Graves, 656 N.W.2d at 202.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Weinstein v. Siemens, 673 F. Supp. 2d 533, 553 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
55. Boren v. Worthen Nat’l Bank of Ark., 921 S.W.2d 934, 941–42 (Ark. 1996) (rejecting the
totality of the circumstances test but leaving open the question of which of the remaining two tests
should be applied: specific harm or the prior similar incidents tests); Willmon v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1074, 1078 (E.D. Ark. 1997), aff’d, 143 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 1998).
56. Boren, 921 S.W.2d at 940.
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impose a duty on Worthen to guard against the criminal acts of a third
party.”57
In contrast, the Boren court noted that it was only under a totality of
circumstances test that the plaintiffs could have established a duty of care
owed by Worthen. The court framed its analysis using “places or character
of the business” language from the Restatement, and considered “the
nature, condition, and location of the premises, in addition to any prior
similar incidents, and a duty can be found where no prior criminal attacks
have occurred.”58 Under this test, the plaintiffs would have been owed a
duty under the rationale that all ATMs carry an inherent risk due to their
purpose and location.
Ultimately, the court used foreseeability and public policy to
reconcile the difference in outcomes between the tests. “In all three tests,
the foreseeability of the criminal act is a crucial element in determining
whether a duty is owed.”59 However, the court found that adoption of a
totality of the circumstances test would impose responsibility for violent,
non-foreseeable, third-party criminal conduct onto businesses.60 In doing
so, the court expressly laid out its priorities regarding community safety
and responsibility in the final sentences of its opinion:
We also cannot say that it would be appropriate as a matter of policy
to impose a higher duty on business owners who are willing to
provide their services in “high crime areas” or “near a housing
project”—most commonly the areas in which low and moderate
income residents are to be found.61

Since Boren, one case has applied both specific harm and prior
similar incidents tests; however, it remains unclear whether the joint
application of these tests is conjunctive or disjunctive. In Willmon v. WalMart Stores, the court adopted a Boren framework, only to conclude that
a customer’s abduction from a store parking lot and subsequent rape and
murder were unforeseeable under both specific harm and prior similar
incidents tests with no comment on future application or alternative modes
of recovery.62
However, despite the unclear application of the specific harm and the
prior incidents test from Arkansas courts, what remains clear is their
sentiment as to public policy. Since Willmon, Arkansas has not departed
57. Id. at 941.
58. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344, cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
59. Boren, 921 S.W.2d at 940.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 941–42 (emphasis added).
62. Willmon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1074, 1077 (E.D. Ark. 1997), aff’d, 143 F.3d
1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 1998).
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from its characterization of a third-party claim as a “broad attempt to shift
responsibility for police protection from the government to the private
sector and as imposing limitless demands on business.”63
B. The Prior Similar Incidents Test
The prior similar incidents test recognizes that “[o]ne who controls
the premises does have a duty to use ordinary care to protect invitees from
criminal acts of third parties if he knows or has reason to know of an
unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to the invitee.”64 Foreseeability
is determined through evidence of “specific previous crimes on or near the
premises.”65 There are a few states that generally adhere to this test: Texas,
New York, and Washington.
In Texas, unless the business owner has “direct knowledge that
criminal conduct is imminent,” the court evaluates foreseeable criminal
conduct by applying a five-factor analysis (the Timberwalk factors).66 The
Timberwalk factors include (1) proximity of the crime to the business; (2)
recency of the prior crimes; (3) frequency of the prior crimes; (4) similarity
of the prior crimes; and (5) media coverage or other publicity of the prior
crimes.67 Thus, a large number of prior crimes would result in a finding
that the crime was foreseeable, whereas few prior crimes would not.68
However, in Texas, there is at least one case that references “[t]he nature
and character of the premises” in addition to prior similar incidents.69 In
Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, the court found the Timberwalk factors
were inapplicable and instead focused on “[t]he nature and character of the
premises” as a factor making criminal activity more foreseeable.70 In Del
Lago, a fight occurred in a bar at closing time following ninety minutes of
heated altercations among intoxicated patrons.71 In its analysis of “nature
and character of the premises,” the court recognized that intoxication is
often associated with aggressive behavior and held that Del Lago had a
63. Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on Third-Party
Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1351, 1388 (2010).
64. Trammell Crow Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. 2008).
65. Id. at 12.
66. See Timberwalk Apartments, Partners v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex. 1998); see also
Del Lago Partners v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 767–68 (Tex. 2010).
67. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 759 (holding sexual assault was not foreseeable where there was
only one sexual assault on the premises in the prior year and only six assault–type crimes in
neighboring complexes—none of which were reported in the media or to the defendant).
68. Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Tex. 1999) (concluding 190 violent crimes
in the vicinity is some evidence of foreseeability); Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32.
69. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 768 (holding risk of harm foreseeable in a bar even though there
were few prior incidents involving criminal behavior because patrons were drunk and arguing for
ninety minutes).
70. See id. at 767–68.
71. Id.
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duty to protect if it had actual and direct knowledge that a violent brawl
was imminent between drunk, belligerent patrons and if it had ample time
and means to defuse the situation.72 Thus, the duty arose not because of
prior similar criminal conduct but because the business owner was aware
of an unreasonable risk of harm at the bar that very night.73
New York conducts a similar factor-based analysis under the prior
similar incidents test to determine whether there is a duty of care. The
determination of foreseeability rests on the business owner’s knowledge
of prior criminal activities on his or her premises and is determined based
on the (1) location; (2) nature and extent of previous criminal activities;
(3) their similarity; (4) proximity; or (5) other relationship to the crime in
question.74 In addition, New York recognizes a “‘common-law duty to take
minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable harm,’ including
a third-party’s foreseeable criminal conduct.”75
In premises security cases, “the question of what safety precautions
may reasonably be required of the possessor of realty is generally a
question of fact to be determined by the jury, taking into account such
factors as, inter alia, the seriousness of the risk, the severity of
potential injuries and the cost or burden imposed on the possessor by
reason of each such precautionary measure. However, only those
cases where there arises a real question as to the landowner’s
negligence should the jury be permitted to proceed. In all others,
where proof of any essential element falls short, the case should go
no further.” In New York, a plaintiff’s own conduct “demonstrating
a lack of reasonable regard for his own safety” can serve as an
intervening cause absolving the defendant of liability.76

The predominant criticism of the prior incidents test is that it too
often results in conflicting determinations of foreseeability as a result of
inconsistent application and analysis of several factors, including the
requisite number of prior crimes, the similarity of the crimes, and the

72. Id. at 769.
73. Id.
74. See generally Jacqueline S. ex rel. Ludovina S. v. City of New York, 614 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y.
1993); Huyler v. Rose, 451 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Lauersdorf v. Supermarket Gen.
Corp., 657 N.Y.S.2d 732 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
75. Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (N.Y. 1998).
76. Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32. See also id.; Benitez v. Paxton Realty Corp., 637
N.Y.S.2d 11, 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding that the plaintiff’s opening of door after dark without
first checking the peephole to see who was at the door was an intervening cause of the criminal act);
Elie v. Kraus, 631 N.Y.S.2d 16, 18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Ruggerio v. Bd. of Educ., 298 N.Y.S.2d
149, 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (granting summary judgment for the defendants on the failure to
supervise a claim because the plaintiff voluntarily engaged in a physical altercation that led to his
injury).
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temporal and geographic proximity of the prior crimes.77 Further criticism
disavows the prior similar incidents rule, arguing that it is in contravention
of public policy and notions of fundamental fairness through its near
requirement that a crime occurs before preventative measures be taken. In
a sense, the approach allows for one “get out of liability card” by allowing
the first crime to occur; thus, removing any incentive to take preventative
measures until and if that crime occurs and that victim is denied
recovery.78
C. Superior Knowledge Test
A conservative enhancement to the traditional prior incidents test is
the two-pronged superior knowledge approach.79 The superior knowledge
test, with similarities to the imminent harm test, observes that business
owners cannot protect people from random third-party acts of violence
unless they are on notice of a special danger as a result of their unique
position as an owner of the business.80 The superior knowledge test also
incorporates the perspective and actual knowledge of the plaintiff as to
whether he or she was aware of the risk of violence in a particular area
before patronizing the business.81
Georgia’s strict analysis requires that the plaintiff show not only that
the proprietor had a duty to protect him on the basis of foreseeability, but
also show that the existence of that duty depends on the superior or unique
knowledge of the proprietor.82 It follows that in the absence of
foreseeability, a proprietor would not have superior knowledge of the
danger. However, under this stringent approach, even if the criminal act is
foreseeable, it may not necessarily be the case that the proprietor has
superior knowledge, and thus, it has no duty to protect invitees.
Under Georgia’s analysis, determination of foreseeability reverts to
a prior incidents test, which examines whether prior acts were substantially
similar to the occurrence that caused harm by looking at factors including
“the location, nature and extent of the prior criminal activities and their
likeness, proximity or other relationship to the crime in question.”83 To
77. Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 413–15 (Wyo. 1997).
78. Id. at 414; Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32.
79. Whitmore v. First Fed. Sav. Bank of Brunswick, 484 S.E.2d 708, 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that “[i]f a criminal act is not foreseeable, it logically follows that the proprietor does not
have superior knowledge of the danger of its occurrence. But even if the criminal act is foreseeable, it
does not necessarily follow that the proprietor has superior knowledge, since the danger may be
equally apparent to the plaintiff.”).
80. See Wade v. Findlay Mgmt., Inc., 560 S.E.2d 283, 284 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
81. Id. at 285.
82. See Whitmore, 484 S.E.2d at 711. See generally Days Inns of America v. Matt, 454 S.E.2d
507 (Ga. 1995); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 405 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. 1991).
83. Vega v. La Movida, Inc., 670 S.E.2d 116, 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
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evaluate superior knowledge, courts examine (1) whether there is a history
of substantially similar criminal acts at or near the same location readily
known to the plaintiff or the public84 and (2) whether the business owner
had unique knowledge that a specific third party with a history of violence
will be present at the business.85
D. Totality of Circumstances Test
The vast majority of courts have abrogated a conservative analysis
for determining liability in favor of a more liberal analysis: the totality of
circumstances test. The following state courts have adopted the totality of
the circumstances test: Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, Minnesota, Idaho,
Nevada, South Dakota, Hawai’i, Florida, Indiana, Wyoming, Colorado,
and Massachusetts.86 Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, duty
is imposed “where circumstances exist from which the owner could
reasonably foresee that its customers have a risk of peril above and beyond
the ordinary and that appropriate security measures should be taken.”87
In essence, the totality of circumstances rule is an expansion of the
prior incidents test that considers not only prior similar incidents but other
concomitant factors. The totality of circumstances test is more case-centric
and requires a solid working knowledge of all of the attendant facts of the
case at hand. However, in consideration of the circumstances of the
particular case, there often must be a close connection or direct
relationship between the harm sustained and the foreseeability of the
conduct.88 Pertinent “circumstances” may include, but are not limited to,
(1) the location of the crime and a review of prior criminal activity in the
area; (2) the condition of the premises; (3) the design of the premises,
including adequacy of lighting and architectural design; (4) the nature of
the business and its hours of operation; (5) the extent and quality of
security measures taken by the owner such as safes, guards, locks, alarms
or surveillance; (6) the business owner’s knowledge of the intoxication or
consistent use of alcohol and drugs on the premises; (7) prior warnings
from law enforcement or employees regarding a threat on the premises;
and (8) industry standards regarding security measures.89

84. See Wade, 560 S.E.2d at 285.
85. See B-T Two, Inc. v. Bennett, 706 S.E.2d 87, 92 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); Norby v. Heritage
Bank, 644 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Mason v. Chateau Cmtys., Inc., 633 S.E.2d 426, 432
(Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
86. Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32.
87. Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Kan. 1993).
88. See Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 662 (Cal. 1985), holding modified by
Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993); see also Seibert, 856 P.2d at 1339.
89. See generally Axelrod v. Cinemark Holdings, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1093 (D. Colo. 2014);
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For example, consider a parking lot located in a high crime area;
under a totality of the circumstances, the factor of location will be
considered. The rationale is embodied in the public policy that “one should
not be able to open an all-night, poorly lit parking lot in a dangerous high
crime area of an inner city with no security and have no legal foreseeability
until after a substantial number of one’s own patrons have fallen victim to
violent crimes,” as under such circumstances, criminal activity is “not only
foreseeable but virtually inevitable.”90
In addition, in jurisdictions that apply the totality of circumstances
test, it may also be necessary to determine state statutory requirements or
limitations on liability specific to the type of business. For example,
consider Florida Statute § 768.0705, which creates a statutory presumption
against liability for the criminal acts of a third person if the owner or
operator of a convenience business substantially implements the certain
security measures.91 Likewise, under the Nevada Revised Statute §
651.020, innkeepers and bar owners who have fulfilled a duty to eject
patrons reasonably are protected.92
Not unsurprisingly, the prevailing critique of the totality of the
circumstances tests centers on the heavy burden placed on business owners
to foresee the risk of criminal attacks on their property, and it criticizes the
imposition of “an unqualified duty to protect customers in areas
experiencing any significant level of criminal activity.”93 Still, other critics
feel that the test invades the province of the jury as the fact-finder by
attempting to determine foreseeability from all the facts
and circumstances and erroneously equating the foreseeability of a
specific act with previous occurrences of such an act.94 As noted, the
general principle that a business owner is not an insurer of the premises
exists across jurisdictions. With that in mind, critics argue that in the face
of increasingly frequent random mass shootings, no amount of security
measures can protect against random acts of violence.95 Imputing such a
Cause of Action Against Landlord for Failure to Protect Tenants Against Criminal Acts, in CAUSES
OF ACTION SECOND SERIES, 34 COA2d 105 (2019); Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32; Uri
Kaufman, When Crime Pays: Business Landlords’ Duty to Protect Customers from Criminal Acts
Committed on the Premises, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 89, 96–97 (1990).
90. Seibert, 856 P.2d at 1339.
91. FLA. STAT. § 768.0705 (West 2018).
92. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.020 (West 2017); Rodriguez v. Primadonna Co., 216 P.3d 793,
798 (Nev. 2009) (holding that commercial liquor vendors, including hotel proprietors, cannot be held
liable for damages related to any injuries caused by the intoxicated patron to third parties under certain
circumstances).
93. Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, 752 So. 2d 762, 767 (La. 1999).
94. JOHN ELLIOT LEIGHTON, LITIGATING PREMISES SECURITY CASES § 2:10, Westlaw (database
updated Nov. 2018).
95. Caleo & Rivera, supra note 38, at 32.
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duty to prevent random violent crime would place a significant economic
burden on business owners.96
E. Other Tests
The balancing test is one of the more modern approaches
implemented to date.97 Under this test, business owners assume the duty
to protect if the foreseeability and gravity of the harm outweigh the burden
to protect their invitees—thus, a balancing test.98 California was the first
state to implement this approach, recognizing in a series of seminal
opinions that:
In cases where the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high
degree of foreseeability may be required. On the other hand, in cases
where there are strong policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the
harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of
foreseeability may be required.99

Further, “duty in such circumstances is determined by a balancing of
‘foreseeability’ of the criminal acts against the ‘burdensomeness,
vagueness, and efficacy’ of the proposed security measures.”100
For instance, in the case of Ann M., the plaintiff had been raped at
the photo store where she worked, and she sued the shopping plaza in
which the store was located, claiming there was a duty to hire security
guards to protect against such crimes.101 In its analysis, the court balanced
the foreseeability of the criminal act against the burden, vagueness, and
efficacy of the proposed security precaution.102 While some evidence of
prior crimes in the shopping plaza existed—including bank robberies,
purse snatchings, and a man pulling down a woman’s pants—there was no
evidence rising to the severity of rape.103 In that case, the court found that
the burden of hiring security guards was so high that the requisite
foreseeability to trigger the burden could rarely, if ever, be proven without
prior similar incidents.104 Interestingly, it appears that California courts
engage a heightened standard of care in determining whether business
owners have a duty to employ security personnel, as evidenced by their
96. Id.
97. California was the first state to implement this test in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping
Center, 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993).
98. See Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993).
99. Id. at 215; Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658 (Cal. 1985).
100. Ann M., 863 P.2d at 215; Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Ctrs., Inc., 88 P.3d 517, 522–23
(Cal. 2004).
101. Ann M., 863 P.2d at 210–211.
102. Id. at 215.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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reluctance to impose a duty in the absence of prior similar incidents in that
location.
In addition to California, Louisiana and Tennessee have also adopted
the balancing test. In an analysis identical to California’s, Louisiana
weighs the foreseeability of the risk of crime on the business owner’s
property and the gravity of the risk to determine the existence and the
extent of the defendant’s duty.105 The court has expressly indicated that
determinations must “make a policy decision in light of the unique facts
and circumstances presented.”106 Louisiana courts consider various
moral, social, and economic factors, including the fairness of
imposing liability; the economic impact on the defendant and on
similarly situated parties; the need for an incentive to prevent future
harm; the nature of defendant’s activity; the potential for an
unmanageable flow of litigation; the historical development of
precedent; and the direction in which society and its institutions are
evolving. 107

Additionally, the Louisiana courts have explained that with respect
to security measures, while a lower degree of foreseeability may impose a
duty to implement security measures such as use and installation of
security cameras or improved lighting, a very high degree of foreseeability
is required to give rise to a duty to post security guards.108
In its implementation of the balancing test, Tennessee also observes
that risks are unreasonable and give rise to a duty to act with due care, if
the probability of foreseeability and the gravity of harm posed by the
defendant’s conduct outweigh the burden upon defendant to engage in
alternative conduct that would have prevented the harm.109 In its analysis,
the courts have considered several non-exclusive factors in determining
the reasonableness of the risk, including:
[1] the foreseeable probability of the harm or injury occurring; [2] the
possible magnitude of the potential harm or injury; [3] the importance
or social value of the activity engaged in by defendant; [4] the
usefulness of the conduct to defendant; [5] the feasibility of
alternative, safer conduct and the relative costs and burdens

105. Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762, 766 (La. 1999).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Pinsonneault v. Merchs. & Farmers Bank & Tr. Co., 816 So. 2d 270, 276 (La. 2002);
Posecai, 752 So. 2d at 768.
109. McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995); McClung v. Delta Square Ltd.
P’ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 901 (Tenn. 1996).
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associated with that conduct; [6] the relative usefulness of the safer
conduct; and [7] the relative safety of alternative conduct.110

Overall, the balancing test acknowledges that duty is a flexible
concept and so seeks to balance the degree of foreseeability of harm
against the burden of the duty to be imposed.111 Moreover, the approach
recognizes that the presence or absence of prior similar incidents of crime
is an important factor in determining the degree of
foreseeability.112 Essentially, the flexibility of the balancing approach
remedies the strictness of the prior similar incidents rules, thus avoiding
“the pitfalls of that rule while solving the problems of [the] more liberal
totality of the circumstances approach.”113
II. CHARACTER OF THE BUSINESS AS A FACTOR IN LIABILITY ANALYSIS
Character of the business as a factor in liability analysis is
predominantly engaged through a totality of the circumstances approach.
Character of the business originates from Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 344. Comment f to § 344 provides that “[if] the place or character of [a
business owner’s] business, or his past experience, is such that he should
reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third
persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a
duty to take precautions against it.”114 This Comment underscores
certain factors to be considered under Restatement § 344, including the
nature of the business location, the character of the business, and past
crimes in the area.115 Liability of a business for the criminal acts of third
persons is based on whether that business had reason to know, from past
experience or from the character of the business, that there was a
likelihood of danger to the safety of any visitor.116 “Character,” in this
regard, has survived multiple interpretations, including the nature,
condition, and location of the premises, in addition to whether any prior
similar incidents occurred on the premises, and a duty can be found where
no prior criminal attacks have occurred.117
110. McClung, 937 S.W.2d at 901.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; Donna Lee Welch, Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center: The California Supreme
Court Retreats from Its ‘Totality of the Circumstances’ Approach to Premises Liability, 28 GA. L.
REV. 1053, 1069 (1994).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis added).
115. MacQuarrie v. Howard Johnson Co., 877 F.2d 126, 130 (1st Cir. 1989); Richardson v.
QuikTrip Corp., 81 S.W.3d 54, 60–61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002).
116. Boren v. Worthen Nat’l Bank of Arkansas, 921 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Ark. 1996).
117. See Isaacs v. Huntington Mem’l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 658 (Cal. 1985); Hills v. Bridgeview
Little League Ass’n, 745 N.E.2d 1166, 1186–88 (Ill. 2000); Torres v. United States Nat’l Bank, 670
P.2d 230 (Or. 1983); see also Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 216 (Cal. 1993)
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In recent years, an increasing number of courts across state
jurisdictions have incorporated character of the business into their
analysis. To date, at least California, Illinois, Missouri, New Jersey,
Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin have incorporated this factor. In
Wisconsin, courts have repeatedly held that in amusement facilities,
taverns, and businesses where a crowd or a large number of people
assemble on a business owner’s property for purposes of financial gain, a
business owner assumes an ordinary duty of care to protect the individuals
from reasonably foreseeable injury.118 For instance, when a patron of a bar
exited following expulsion of several unruly customers and sustained a
head injury as a result of an ensuing assault, the court noted a tavern owner
owes a duty to patrons “because the owner has superior knowledge of
dangers that the place and character of the . . . [tavern] may pose.”119
In Illinois, a court likewise looked to character of the business in its
determination that a restaurant owed a duty to aid or protect customers
against the unreasonable risk of physical harm posed by negligent acts of
third persons after a vehicle crashed through a wall of a restaurant and
struck and killed a patron.120 In its analysis, the court looked to the
restaurant’s location, various aspects of its design, and evidence of an
absence of safety precautions to prevent out of control vehicles from
entering the restaurant.121
New Jersey has also repeatedly used character of the business in
applying a totality of the circumstances analysis. While typically a prior
similar incidents test would reject evidence of substantial thefts as putting
a business owner on notice for kidnapping and murder, in Clohesy v. Food
Circus Supermarkets, Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the
kidnapping and murder of a supermarket customer from a parking lot were
sufficiently foreseeable. Looking at the nature of the offense and specific
characteristics of the location (a parking lot), the court held that
(1) theft offenses frequently escalate into more violent crimes, (2) the
crime rate in the defendant’s area had increased substantially in the
(noting that the character of some business establishments open to the public, such as a parking garage
or an all-night convenience store, creates an especial temptation and opportunity for criminal
misconduct that helps give rise to, and affects the scope of, the duty to protect).
118. See Alonge v. Rodriquez, 279 N.W.2d 207, 211 (Wis. 1979); Flynn v. Audra’s Corp., 796
N.W.2d 230, 233 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011). See generally Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 48
N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1951); Emerson v. Riverview Rink & Ballroom, 290 N.W. 129 (Wis. 1940).
119. Flynn, 796 N.W.2d at 233.
120. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1062 (Ill. 2006).
121. Id. (finding that location in an area with a “high traffic count” and design aspects, including
its “brick half wall” and sidewalk, rendered the restaurant susceptible to penetration by out-of-control
automobiles; that defendants took no precautions, such as installing “vertical concrete pillars or poles,”
to prevent automobiles from entering the restaurant; and that defendants had knowledge of all of the
foregoing gave rise to a duty to protect).
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previous two years, and (3) recent crime statistics indicated that
approximately 757,000 violent crimes such as rape, robbery, and
assaults occurred in parking lots located throughout the nation.122

While the court was cognizant of the potential impact its decision
may have had on the question of duty owed to customers by small business
owners near large businesses such as malls, it reasoned that risk
determination was a case-by-case analysis.123 Thus, the decision
represented not a major change in the law, but rather a definitive “nudge”
forward. 124
Similarly, Oregon recently clarified what characteristics give rise to
a reasonable inference that a “place or character” imputes liability onto a
business owner for third-party criminal acts. The court expressly
articulated that “specific factual support—as opposed to relying on
generalized abstractions about the existence of criminal activity” or a
theoretical possibility that such a harm might occur was required in order
to impute liability.125
In sum, when employing a character of the business test in a totality
of the circumstances analysis, courts tend to focus on whether the place
and character of a location or business “invited” the criminal behavior or
if the defendant’s business, by its nature, made it particularly attractive
to crime, thus imposing a duty to protect customers. Jurisdictions across
the country have found that bars, amusement parks, and other large
gathering businesses owe an ordinary duty of care to their patrons.126 In
analyzing character of the business, some jurisdictions go further still by
looking to the precise location of the business and security
implementations in an attempt to prevent an “open all-night, poorly lit
parking lot in a dangerous high crime area of an inner city with no

122. Peguero v. Tau Kappa Epsilon Local Chapter, 106 A.3d 565, 574 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2015); see also Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 694 A.2d 1017, 1027 (N.J. 1997) (the
court gave heavy weight to a United States Justice Department report in 1994, which stated that
approximately 757,000 violent crimes such as rape, robbery, and assaults occurred in parking lots
located throughout this country).
123. Clohesy, 694 A.2d at 1030.
124. Id.
125. Stewart v. Kids Inc. of Dallas, 261 P.3d 1272, 1283 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that
the plaintiff’s complaint alleging that family restaurant business should know that widely advertising
an event with minors would attract sexual predators was “nothing more than a theoretical possibility”
in the absence of evidence in fact that “sexual assault occurs at these types of sites, or among gatherings
of teenagers in public places, or that sexual assault is a ‘hazard inherent’ in this type of activity”); see
also Piazza ex rel. Piazza v. Kellim, 354 P.3d 698, 707–08 (Or. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Piazza
v. Kellim, 377 P.3d 492 (Or. 2016).
126. See Alonge v. Rodriquez, 279 N.W.2d 207, 211 (Wis. 1979); Flynn v. Audra’s Corp., 796
N.W.2d 230, 233 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011). See generally Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 48
N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1951); Emerson v. Riverview Rink & Ballroom, 290 N.W. 129 (Wis. 1940).
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security” with no legal foreseeability until after a substantial number of
one’s own patrons have fallen victim to violent crimes.127
The majority of criticism befalling character of the business argues
that the approach paints foreseeability in broad strokes. Critics find that
with the standard comes a risk of restricting certain businesses and
imposing significant burdens on the owners of those businesses as a result.
This is particularly evident in the context of banks. For example, the
Oregon Court of Appeals in Torres v. United States National Bank held
that a customer injured in a holdup did not need to allege previous assaults
or robberies at the particular bank night depository.128 Rather, they
explained that generalized evidence would suffice to establish a duty on
the part of the bank, “including evidence of similar incidents at other local
night depositories, the effect of an obscured location on the chance of a
robbery, or any other circumstances tending to show the risk inherent in
an invitation to do banking business after regular hours.”129 The court’s
utilization of a multi-factor approach that considered the purpose or
“status” of the business in determining customer safety and business
liability, in essence, applied a duty of reasonable care under the
circumstances considering the purpose or character of a bank and nature
of the bank–patron relationship.130
Inherent in this criticism is an acknowledgment that “place and
character of the business” and “nature of the business” are subject to
varying and wide interpretation. The application from the jurisdictions
remains unclear. While some jurisdictions look narrowly to the actual
purpose of the business, others look to the disposition and conditions
surrounding the business. What is clear, however, is that character of the
business remains not a dispositive indicator of liability but a mere factor.
With a new jurisdiction prime to interpret just what character of the
business means,131 we must inquire about the role of public policy behind
this factor and in the liability analysis of third-party criminal acts as a
whole. In jurisdictions employing more liberal approaches, such as totality
of the circumstances and the balancing test, public policy prefers crime
127. Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1339 (Kan. 1993).
128. Torres v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 670 P.2d 230, 235–36 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
129. Id.; see also Richard E. Vogel, Institutional Liability for Attacks on ATM Patrons, U. ILL.
L. REV. 1009, 1024 (1994).
130. The logic continues that unlike other types of stores or commercial enterprises, banks exist
to receive, hold, and distribute money. As such, members of the public generally believe themselves
to be in a safe place when transacting with banking business. This is also contrasted with the fact that
banks hold and deal with substantial amounts of cash and the high-profile nature of bank-related crime.
Altogether, these “status” factors pose a certain risk to members of the public and thus oblige banks
to take measures to afford reasonable safety. Vogel, supra note 129, at 1024. For another application
of this logic, see Stalzer v. European Am. Bank, 448 N.Y.S.2d 631, 635–636 (Civ. Ct. 1982).
131. McKown v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 344 P.3d 661, 664 (Wash. 2015).
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prevention. However, in jurisdictions employing a more conservative
analysis, such as specific imminent harm, superior knowledge, or prior
incidents tests, public policy prefers lessened economic burdens on
business owners. In a climate where third-party violence, and in particular,
mass shooting violence, continues to increase, Washington is in a
pioneering position to move towards maximizing safety and compensation
to injured parties and away from conventional notions of fault
determinations. By interpreting character of the business broadly to
consider the disposition of the surrounding conditions of a business,
Washington has the chance to promote social welfare by enhancing safety
and ensuring compensation to those harmed in the course of third-party
violence.
III. COMMENTARY ON POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE AND THE BROKEN WINDOWS THEORY
Character of the business has been repeatedly interpreted in several
jurisdictions as broadly evaluative of the nature and surrounding
conditions of a business.132 Encompassed in this interpretation are
considerations of what should be seemingly obvious factors, which are too
often dismissed under the other conservative liability analyses. The factors
include (1) crime rate in the precise area, including petty and other nonviolent property crime; (2) apparent security measures; (3) vulnerability
as a large patron gathering space; and (4) overall appearance of the
premises. To further stress the necessity of such considerations, the
following section reviews the criminological theory of broken windows,
providing a sociological basis for focus on larger crime rates, apparent
security measures, and disorder as a way to not only quell the commission
of third-party criminal violence, but also to hold businesses liable when it
does occur.
This framework will provide an expansive program that will be far
more effective in combating not only mass gun violence but the overall
prevention of felonies. The program promotes the safe practice of
community monitoring and maintenance in order to prevent businesses
from becoming increasingly vulnerable and susceptible to attack. If
implemented, the resulting broad interpretation of character of the
business could encourage the maintenance and security of businesses, such
as Cascade Mall, so that they are no longer predatory areas but protected
ones.

132. See generally Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993); Marshall
v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048 (Ill. 2006); Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d
1332 (Kan. 1993); Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 694 A.2d 1017 (N.J. 1997).
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A. Broken Windows: The Theory
In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling introduced the
broken windows theory into the lexicon in an article in The Atlantic
Monthly.133 Based on a 1969 field study conducted by Phillip Zimbardo, a
Stanford
psychologist,
the
broken
windows
theory is
a criminological theory that focuses on the effects of sociological
concepts—norm-setting and signaling of urban disorder, disturbance,
and vandalism—on more serious crimes and anti-social behavior.134 In his
study, Zimbardo abandoned two comparable cars, each without license
plates and parked with their hoods up, one on the street in Bronx, New
York and the other on a street in Palo Alto, California.135 Remarkably,
within ten minutes of “abandonment,” the vehicle in the Bronx was
attacked by “vandals” who removed the radiator and battery.136 Within
twenty-four hours, everything of value had been removed: windows were
smashed, parts torn off, upholstery ripped, and children began to use the
car for a playground.137 At the same time, in Palo Alto, the vehicle
remained untouched for over a week.138 Then Zimbardo did something
unusual and unconventional—he smashed part of the Palo Alto car with a
sledgehammer.139 Within a few short hours, passersby had joined in the
destruction, and the car was utterly destroyed—just as the car in the Bronx
had been.140
This field study demonstrated—very simply—how neglect,
abandonment, and the appearance of disorder can make something quickly
become a vulnerable target for criminals. In the article, Kelling and Wilson
synthesized that a broken window or other visible signs of disorder or
decay, such as loitering, graffiti, prostitution, or drug use, can send the
signal that a neighborhood is uncared for.141 A brief summary of the theory
comes from the following passage:
We suggest that “untended” behavior also leads to the breakdown of
community controls. A stable neighborhood of families who care for
their homes, mind each other’s children, and confidently frown on
unwanted intruders can change, in a few years or even a few months,
133. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 1.
134. Id. at 4.
135. Id. The distinction between these two locations is relevant. In the first, at the time the Bronx
was a predominantly low-income, crime-ridden section of New York City. In contrast, Palo Alto was
a fairly affluent neighborhood outside of San Francisco in California. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 5.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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to an inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of property is
abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop
scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become more
rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in. Teenagers
gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks them to move;
they refuse. Fights occur. Litter accumulates. People start drinking in
front of the grocery; in time, an inebriate slumps to the sidewalk and
is allowed to sleep it off. Pedestrians are approached by
panhandlers.142

According to the theory, maintaining and monitoring urban
environments would aid in the prevention of small crimes such
as vandalism, public drinking, and crimes against property by fostering an
appearance of law and order, thereby preventing more serious crimes from
happening. “The idea [is] that once disorder begins, it doesn’t matter what
the neighborhood is, things can begin to get out of control.”143 In the Palo
Alto study, it took just one hit from a sledgehammer to the vehicle to
attract disorder. If one sledgehammer hit can cause an empty car to be
completely destroyed by vandals and mere passersby, it is concerning to
think what years of depreciation and neglect could cause to a business.
Kelling and Wilson proposed that police departments change their
focus. Officers should try to clean up the streets and maintain order rather
than channeling most resources into solving major crimes.144 “Untended
property becomes fair game” and the mere opportunity of disorder invites
people to participate who may not have otherwise considered it.145 Thus,
neglect and abandonment demonstrate a lack of care that in turn fosters an
atmosphere of increased abandonment by community members out of fear
for safety. It is these areas that are particularly vulnerable to criminal
activity.146 Overall, Kelling and Wilson’s broken windows model focuses
on the role that disorder and appearance of disorder play in generating and
sustaining more serious crime.147 Disorder is not directly linked to serious
crime; rather, disorder leads to increased fear and withdrawal from
residents, which then allows more serious crime to move in because of
decreased levels of informal social control and increased vulnerability of
those locations as a target.
142. Id.
143. Shankar Vedantam et al., How a Theory of Crime and Policing Was Born, and Went
Terribly Wrong, NPR (Nov. 1, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/11/01/500104506/brokenwindows-policing-and-the-origins-of-stop-and-frisk-and-how-it-went-wrong [https://perma.cc/378JPAT8].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Kelling & Wilson, supra note 1, at 15.
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B. “Broken Windows” Application and Implementation
In its initial recommendation and acceptance, the broken windows
theory was wholly targeted at policing and the traditional role that the
police force plays in crime control and crime prevention. As a result of the
broken windows theory, police were encouraged to focus their efforts on
less serious crime in neighborhoods that had not yet been overtaken by
serious crime.148 Targeting efforts in this way has the effect of reducing
resident fear and withdrawal.149
Washington State has an opportunity to broadly define character of
the business as expressly noted by the court in McKown v. Simon
Properties. However, at its current progression, the case law suggests that
Washington is gravitating from a prior incidents test toward a specific
harm test. This is in large part suggested through Washington’s express
rejection of the concept that a business owner owes a duty to invitees
merely because the business is located in a high crime area: “if the
premises are located in an area where criminal assaults often occur,
imposition of a duty could result in the departure of the businesses from
urban core areas—an undesirable result.”150 Furthermore, the Washington
Supreme Court applies an enhanced prior incidents analysis, which
requires that a criminal act must be “sufficiently similar in nature and
location to the prior acts of violence, sufficiently close in time to the act in
question, and sufficiently numerous” for the act to be considered
foreseeable.151
Particularly in the wake of multiple incidents of mass gun
violence, both within the state of Washington and the United States, the
focus must return to maximizing safety and compensating injured parties
and away from narrowly imposing liability out of concern for economic
burden. Washington has the opportunity to offset the stringency of its
current prior incidents test by interpreting character of the business to
include surrounding conditions—including petty crime rate, apparent
security, and disposition of the business—in determining foreseeability.
Incorporation of such an interpretation is not only supported by the case
law of fellow states but grounded through the thesis of the criminological
broken windows theory. By taking into account petty crime rate, apparent
security measures, and disposition of the business, the courts could engage
148. Id.
149. David Weisberg & Cynthia Lum, Broken Windows Policing, CTR. EVIDENCE BASED CRIME
POL’Y (2013), http://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/what-works-in-policing/research-evidencereview/broken-windows-policing/ [https://perma.cc/MA2G-GXQK].
150. McKown v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 344 P.3d 661, 668 (Wash. 2015) (quoting Hutchins v.
1001 Fourth Ave. Assocs., 802 F.2d 1360, 1370 (Wash. 1991)).
151. Id. at 669.
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in crime prevention by holding businesses liable for third-party criminal
attacks when they fail to keep their premises safe with adequate security
and permit a disorderly condition.
Especially with respect to malls, movie theaters, and schools—or any
place where a large gathering of persons occurs—there should be a
standard of foreseeability that reflects the vulnerability of such businesses.
The introduction of this Comment began with the case of Cascade Mall.
In addition to its purpose as a gathering location, Cascade Mall had several
indicators of vulnerability: abandoned storefronts, low population, and
high crime statistics in the immediate area.152 As explained through the
broken windows theory, the appearance of disorder leads to increased fear
and withdrawal from residents, which then allows more serious crime to
move in because of decreased levels of informal social control and
increased vulnerability of those locations as a target. Sadly, in this case, at
least one man did take advantage of Cascade Mall’s vulnerability. Using
the broken windows theory as a means to interpret character of the
business as a factor in determining the duty to protect in Washington
would be an expansive move. But it would be a move that affords an
opportunity to combat situations like Cascade Mall—and hopefully
prevent further violence, particularly mass gun violence, from occurring
again.
CONCLUSION
Washington State has the opportunity to clarify and expand the
definition of character of the business in an unfortunate climate where
mass violence and third-party criminal acts are increasing in prevalence.
Washington’s current prior incidents liability analysis does not fully
address public policy concerns of safety. Moreover, narrow enhancements
in Washington’s prior incidents test indicate a conservative turn that all
but curtails a determination of foreseeability in a case of third-party
criminal acts. These restrictions limit the liability of businesses for failing
to protect their patrons and leave injured plaintiffs uncompensated for
harms sustained.
This Comment provides an overview of the various state analyses for
determining liability for third-party criminal conduct and specifically
breaks down how states have incorporated the concept of character of the
business as a factor in liability analysis. The criminological theory of
broken windows introduced how the appearance of disorder could lead to
further crime. Combined with case law across the jurisdictions, the broken
windows perspective provides a sociological basis for expanding the
152. Cascade Mall-13 Reviews, supra note 13.
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definition of character of the business to include circumstances
surrounding the nature and condition of the business.
The time has come for an expansive standard to be established. Such
a standard would not single out business owners by imposing an
absolute duty upon them to perform society’s work but at the same time
would not allow business owners with clearly inadequate security to
escape responsibility. Adoption of a standard that incorporates a
sociological understanding of the effects of an atmosphere of crime, such
as the one proposed through the inclusion of the character of the business
factor, is a feasible solution towards the difficult balancing of victims’
compensation and protection of business owners. By embracing a more
expansive definition, Washington would increase its ability to stave off
future instances of third-party criminal conduct. Furthermore, promoting
safe practices of community monitoring and maintenance in order to
prevent businesses from becoming increasingly vulnerable and susceptible
to attack would serve as a strong indication that Washington cares for its
citizens and wants to keep them safe.

